[1] viXra:1110.0026 [pdf] submitted on 7 Oct 2011
Authors: Armin Nikkhah Shirazi
Comments: 6 pages
An important debate in the philosophy of science, whether an instrumentalist or realist view
of science correctly characterizes science, is examined in this paper through the lens of a related
debate, namely whether science is a social construct or not. The latter debate arose in response
to Kuhn's work The Structure of Scientic Revolutions, in which he argued that while there
exists a process through which scientic understanding evolves from primitive to increasingly
rened ideas, it does not describe progress 'toward' anything. Kuhn's work was then used to
argue that there is no such thing as a knowable objective reality, a view much in agreement
with that of the instrumentalist.
This paper argues that a generalized version of the correspondence principle applied to a
theory's domain of validity is an exclusive feature of science which distinguishes it from socially
constructed phenomena and thereby supports the realist position. According to this argument,
progress in science can be characterized as the replacement of old paradigms by new ones with
greater domains of validity which obey the correspondence principle where the two paradigms
overlap. This characterization, however, is susceptible to the instrumentalist objection that it
does not t the transition from Aristotelian to Newtonian physics. In response, it is required
that this argument depend on the intactness of certain core concepts in the face of experimental
challenge within some regions of the theory's original domain of validity. While this requirement
saves the argument and even oers an answer to the question of what it would take for our most
established theories in physics, relativity and quantum theory, to suer the same fate as
Aristotelian physics, it also defers a conclusive resolution to the debate between instrumentalists
and realists until it can be determined whether an ultimate theory of nature can be found.
Category: History and Philosophy of Physics